Ethanol production in the United States has been steadily growing and is expected to continue growing. Many politicians see increased ethanol use as a way to promote environmental goals, such are reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and energy security goals. This paper analyzes the economic and political issues surrounding the ethanol industry. It provides a cost-benefit analysis of substantially increasing ethanol production, and finds that costs are likely to exceed benefits by about three billion dollars annually in 2012 if current policies continue. It also suggests that earlier attempts aimed at promoting ethanol would have likely failed a benefit-cost test.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ethanol is a fuel that has been touted by politicians and technologists for a variety of reasons related to both energy security and the environment. It figures prominently in President Bush's strategy to address climate change. 1 Largely as a result of government policies, the production of ethanol in the United States is expected to grow dramatically during the next decade. As of December 2007, there are 134 ethanol plants in the United States with a total capacity of more than 7 billion gallons per year. 2 This capacity is expected to exceed 13 billion gallons per year after current construction and expansion projects are completed. 3 Interest group support for ethanol has been a major factor behind the increase in production. Many politicians see increased ethanol use as a way to promote environmental goals and energy security goals while catering to key interest groups, such as corn farmers and environmentalists. This paper analyzes legal, economic, and political issues surrounding the ethanol industry, with particular focus on ethanol policy in the United States.
At first glance, ethanol appears to be a regional issue because production is concentrated in the Midwest. Most plants are close to farm land, with more than 40 plants in the state of Iowa alone. The majority of plants are owned by corporations, which account for about 72 percent of total production capacity. 4 More than 80 percent of the ethanol in the U.S. is produced exclusively from corn.
Ethanol has widespread support in the U.S. An April 2007 poll by CBS News/New York Times found that 70 percent of the public thought ethanol was a good idea, agreeing with the statement that ethanol made from corn is an American-made substitute for foreign oil that causes less air pollution. 5 Politicians are also jumping on the ethanol bandwagon, especially presidential hopefuls campaigning in Iowa, such as Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and Rudy Guiliani. 6 In January 2007, President Bush announced his plan to reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 20 percent in ten years mostly through increased ethanol use. 7 Most ethanol incentive programs are justified by concerns with improving energy security or air quality. Energy security is typically understood to mean reducing U.S. reliance on foreign oil or insecure sources of foreign oil. Because ethanol is currently made from corn and domestic corn production is limited by available land, ethanol is not expected to have a large impact on U.S. oil imports in the short term.
The environmental argument for ethanol relates to possible reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and improvements in local air quality. The evidence on environmental benefits is mixed. Although ethanol is likely to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, it may not decrease overall greenhouse gas emissions. 8 Ethanol use is also likely to reduce carbon monoxide emissions and some air toxics, such as benzene. 9 At the same time, ethanol use increases annual emissions of nitrogen oxides, and ethanol production and transportation may increase emissions of sulfur oxides, particulate matter, and volatile organic compounds. 10 There is also evidence that ethanol use may increase ground-level 4 About 38 percent of the plants are farmer-owned, but these plants only account for about 28 percent of total capacity. In addition, only a small percentage of plants under construction are farmer-owned, meaning that the share of farmer-owned capacity is expected to decrease substantially in the next few years. ozone and water contamination, especially in the Gulf of Mexico. 11 Increasing the production of ethanol is likely to be costly relative to gasoline. On an energy basis, ethanol typically costs more than oil, and is also more costly to distribute in the U.S. 12 In addition, one needs to take into account the deadweight costs of government programs aimed at promoting ethanol, such as the tax credit. The production of ethanol is also resource-intensive, using large amounts of electricity, natural gas, and an average of 4.7 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol. 13 As corn prices increase, corn production will move to marginal lands that will require more fertilizer use to make it arable, causing more emissions.
This paper has three objectives: first, to provide a systematic overview of different aspects of the ethanol issue, including the various laws and regulations supporting ethanol in the U.S. and abroad; second, to provide a benefit-cost analysis of substantially increasing ethanol production; and third, to understand the politics behind ethanol support, and suggest how these politics could affect the development of sensible energy and climate policies.
I discuss laws and regulations related to ethanol in Section II. I explain ethanol's potential to address market failures in section III. I analyze the likely benefits and costs of the future of ethanol in section IV. Section V discusses the political support for ethanol, evaluates whether it is likely to continue, and discusses how politics is likely to affect the design of energy and climate policy. Section VI offers suggestions for better ethanol policy and concludes with suggestions.
In general, I find that policy rationales for ethanol do not justify its widespread support. Ethanol made from corn is not likely to boost energy security and its environmental benefits are uncertain. Costs of increased production are likely to exceed benefits by about three billion dollars annually in 2012 if current policies continue.
14 I also suggest that earlier attempts aimed at promoting ethanol would have likely failed a benefit-cost test. I believe that the growing opposition to ethanol from corn will contribute to decreased support for ethanol in the future. At the same time, I see little reason to believe that energy policy or climate policy will focus primarily on economic efficiency. Finally, I offer some suggestions for the more cost-effective development of energy alternatives that would rely less on prescriptive regulation that selects particular fuels or technologies.
II. LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Ethanol production in the United States has been steadily growing and is expected to continue to grow. The growth in this industry is a direct result of subsidies and regulations at both the federal and state level aimed at promoting ethanol use, especially corn ethanol. 15 This section provides an overview of laws and regulations in the U.S. and the rest of the world aimed at promoting ethanol.
The major driver behind the development of the fuel ethanol industry in the United States is the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit, the federal subsidy for ethanol that is used in gasoline. 16 In 2006, about $2.5 billion dollars was distributed to gasoline blenders through the tax credit, which provides a 51 cent credit against gasoline taxes for every gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline. 17 The federal tax credit was created in 1978 by the Energy Tax Act, which provided blenders with 40 cents for every gallon of ethanol that they blended with gasoline. 18 Although only ethanol blenders could claim this credit, the subsidy indirectly benefits other groups, such as ethanol producers and owners of land where corn can be produced. 19 Congress has increased and decreased the federal tax credit for ethanol blending over the years, but it has always been extended. 20 Although recently lowered to 51 cents, the total amount of the sub- For example, the current law, the tax credit has been extended until 2010. There is also a tax credit for biodiesel production of 50 cents per gallon of biodiesel made from recycled oils and $1 per gallon of biodiesel made from virgin vegetable oils and animal fats. This direct production incentive for biodiesel is recent, only enacted in 2004 through the American Jobs Creation Act.
sidy is actually rising rapidly due to the increased production of ethanol. For example, the Energy Information Administration predicts that annual production of ethanol will exceed 11 billion gallons in 2010. 21 If the entire amount is blended into gasoline, the federal government could incur almost $5 billion annually in direct costs through the tax credit alone. Figure 1 shows the level of this tax credit subsidy over the years. The thick line is the nominal subsidy amount per gallon of ethanol determined by laws, which is measured on the left axis. 22 The thin line is the amount of federal subsidy distributed by the government measured in constant year 2004 dollars on the right axis. The federal tax credit is not the only incentive program for ethanol production. 23 Other incentive programs include the tariff on imported ethanol, grants and loans, the renewable fuels standards, and corn subsidies. There are currently so many programs in place at different levels of government that it has become very difficult to keep track of all of them. One thing is certain: the effective annual subsidy totals are in the billions. In research sponsored by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Koplow finds that ethanol 21 See EIA, Annual Outlook 2007, supra note 17 at Table A17 , converted from quadrillion Btus. The EIA's early release 2008 report predicts even higher amounts of ethanol used in gasoline blending. 22 The laws and regulations that are summarized in the figure are listed in the Appendix, Table A1 . 23 The Appendix, Table A2 , includes a list of current federal laws and regulations that relate to ethanol. received between $5 and $7 billion dollars in subsidies in 2006 from federal and state governments. 24 In absolute size, these subsidies are lower than the subsidies given to energy sources such as fossil fuels and nuclear fission, but the subsidies exceed all other government subsidies to energy in per unit energy terms. 25 Many of these programs have been in place for decades. Below I describe the various other tax, tariff, grant and loan incentive programs that support ethanol in addition to the federal tax credit.
The predominant method of supporting ethanol is through tax incentive programs. The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates that more than $10 billion in support was given to the ethanol industry between 1979 and 2000 in the form of tax incentives. 26 In addition to the federal tax credit, the Small Ethanol Producer Tax Credit is a tax incentive program that provides a tax credit for small ethanol producers, defined as those with a production capacity of up to 60 million gallons. 27 The program allows a 10 cent tax credit on up to 15 million gallons of annual ethanol production, capped at $1.5 million per year per producer. 28 Originally enacted in 1990 under the Clean Air Act Amendments, the credit only applied to producers of up to 30 million gallons of ethanol. The definition of a small ethanol producer was revised in 2004 and the credit was extended.
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One of the most controversial incentive programs is the Omnibus Reconciliation Tax Act enacted in 1980, which established the tariff on imported ethanol. This tariff provides market price support for ethanol producers because the imported ethanol would otherwise drive down the price of domestic ethanol. 30 Because all ethanol was eligible for the blending tax credit, Congress feared the benefits of the credit would go to countries such as Brazil, where sugarcane ethanol is cheaper to produce. 31 Hence, Congress subjected all fuel ethanol to a most-favored-nation added duty, which is currently set at 54 24 See Koplow, supra note 18 at Table 5.1. Subsidies for biodiesel were lower, around $2 billion. Also, the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates about $10 billion of budget authority for energy-related programs. See Agbara, supra note 19. 25 cents. 32 This tariff remains controversial because it goes against professed efforts to increase ethanol consumption by discriminating against foreign producers. 33 The federal government also offers grants and guaranteed loans. In 1980, the Energy Security Act granted insured loans for small ethanol producers that covered up to 90 percent of construction costs on ethanol plants as well as other incentives for biomass projects. 34 The act also allocated $600 million to the Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture for biomass research. Some of this research money, however, was retracted by the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Federal Act, which offered more money for ethanol loan guarantees. There are currently about 12 federal programs that offer grants or loans for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in the United States. 35 Most of these programs were enacted to address air quality concerns.
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments boosted the demand for ethanol by mandating the use of oxygenated fuels in areas that did not meet the air quality standards for carbon monoxide levels. 36 Ethanol adds oxygen to gasoline and helps the engine run more smoothly, reducing carbon monoxide. 37 Although methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was previously the most commonly used oxygenate, ethanol became more popular after many states banned MTBE because of its role in groundwater contamination.
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The renewable fuels standard provision of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ensured demand for ethanol into the future, requiring at least 7.5 billion gallons to be purchased in 2012. 39 Interestingly, assuming that the ethanol tax credits are extended, the Energy Information Administration already predicts that the 7.5 billion gallon mandate will be reached long before 2012 due to production incentives. 40 I provide more analysis of the renewable fuels standard and the Energy Information Administration scenario in section IV.
Because almost all of the current ethanol produced for fuel in the U.S. is made from corn, ethanol producers also benefit from the federal subsidies given to corn. 41 The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) esti-32 Notably, it is above the current tax credit of 51 cents. 33 In addition, some scholars note that the tariff is actually punitive because it more than offsets the tax credit when it is applied. See Koplow, supra note 18 at 12. 34 See EIA, Milestones, supra note 17. 35 See EIA, Federal Incentives, supra note 27. The Appendix, Table A17 . 41 According to the Renewable Fuels Association, ethanol producers create 96 percent of to-mates that about 15 percent of the total subsidy to ethanol comes from ethanol's share of corn producers' subsidies, which is about $1 billion annually. 42 The IISD calculates this amount by taking the share of corn crops that are diverted to ethanol production and multiplying that by the average federal subsidy to corn producers. The actual amount may be lower since some of the subsidies given to corn fall as the price of corn increases. 43 In addition to these federal incentive programs, many states have their own incentive programs for ethanol. A search of the Department of Energy's online database devoted to state and federal incentive programs displays 39 states with at least one grant, tax incentive, or loan program for ethanol. 44 Often, these state laws take the form of tax incentive programs. For example, Iowa has an ethanol tax credit available to fuel stations that sell mostly gasoline blended with ethanol. Once owners pass a 60 percent sale threshold, they are eligible for a tax credit of 2.5 cents for every additional gallon of gasoline blended with ethanol and sold during the year. Indiana has an ethanol production tax credit of 12.5 cents per gallon of ethanol produced with specific caps. Some states have programs in the forms of grants and loans. Maine, for example, has a fund that provides direct loans and subsidies to businesses for designing and building facilities to produce biofuels, the generic name for fuels produced from biomass sources, such as corn ethanol. 46 See Koplow, supra note 18. 47 Foreign country information is from the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA), Ethanol ethanol production, started to develop its industry in the mid-1970s by initiating a government program that guaranteed demand, offered low-interest loans for ethanol plants, and fixed the price of ethanol as compared to gasoline at the pump. 48 During the 1990s, the government eliminated many of the ethanol support programs. 49 Nevertheless, Brazil still requires 20 to 25 percent ethanol blends and gives preferential treatment to ethanol producers. 50 The European Union also has legislation and other mechanisms in place to encourage biofuel production, which includes any fuel made from biomass sources, such as ethanol. 51 For example, the EU has set a 5.75 percent biofuels target for transport fuels by 2010. Though meeting the target is voluntary, member states are expected to report the steps they are taking toward the target each year and the biofuel's share of total transport fuel use.
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There is also support outside of the U.S., EU and Brazil. The Renewable Fuels Association lists ethanol support programs around the world. 53 For example, all gas sold in Bangkok must be blended with at least 10 percent ethanol. India and Argentina require at least 5 percent ethanol in all gas. Finally, Canada offers preferential tax treatment for ethanol producers. These countries also have high ethanol import tariffs in place.
These incentive programs have large impacts. It is difficult, however, to estimate how much of current ethanol production is driven by these programs. The case of biodiesel, a fuel made from natural oils and fats, provides an example of how production can vary in the presence or absence of these programs. A tax credit for biodiesel production was enacted in 2004 under the federal tax credit and has already been extended once. It is currently set to expire in 2008. The credit offers 50 cents per gallon of biodiesel made from recycled oils and $1 per gallon of biodiesel made from virgin vegetable oils and animal fats. The Energy Information Administration predicts production of biodiesel will surge to just over a billion gallons in 2007 and 2008 due to this subsidy. Since the Energy Information Administration assumes that the subsidy will not be extended, it predicts that biodiesel production will fall to about 450 million gallons in 2009 and stay near that level for many years. 54 Hence, over half of the 54 It is actually the policy of the EIA not to assume that laws will not be extended and to make no predictions about laws that may be introduced in the future. In a departure from typical procedure, the EIA assumed that the ethanol tax credit will be extended because of its biodiesel production in the next two years is estimated to be a direct result of the federal biodiesel tax credit. In line with this prediction, the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated in 1995 that ethanol use would drop by at least 50 percent if the ethanol tax credit were eliminated. 55 Despite the support for corn ethanol production, administrative officials realize that corn ethanol cannot achieve their energy security and other goals. 56 Today, many ambitious policies depend on the availability of ethanol from biomass sources such as cellulosic ethanol. 57 For example, cost-effective cellulosic ethanol production is an important part of President Bush's plan to reduce America's gasoline consumption by 20 percent in ten years.
58 Cellulosic ethanol is produced from the structural material of plants, which can be found in agricultural and forestry waste and fast-growing crops such as switchgrass. 59 It uses less energy in its production than does ethanol made from corn, resulting in lower greenhouse gas emissions. 60 Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to break down cellulose into the simple sugars necessary to make ethanol than it is to break down corn. This initiative grants about $150 million to help develop cellulosic technologies. 62 In 2007, the Department of Energy distributed up to $385 million in federal funding to six cellulosic ethanol plants. 63 Previously, federal spending on biofuels research and development was between $50 and $100 million a year between 1978-1998, with only about $15 million a year allocated within the Department of Energy for the years 1978-1980. 64 Ethanol incentive programs in the U.S. have different, and in some cases, conflicting goals. In fact, the ultimate goals of individual laws are rarely made clear, making the policies seem uncoordinated. 65 On one hand, most government biofuel expenditures subsidize corn ethanol. On the other hand, lawmakers are aware that corn ethanol by itself cannot meet U.S.'s energy and environment goals, though it could conceivably help. Not surprisingly, a large portion of the money goes towards research and development programs for cellulosic ethanol, but this amount is smaller than the sums paid to corn ethanol producers. Finally, the permanence of the ethanol tariff seems to imply that the goals of benefiting the U.S. ethanol industry in general outweigh the expressed environmental and energy security goals. 66 For such a high-cost issue, benefits should be clearly defined and a comprehensible national agenda established. The next section will evaluate some of these professed benefits in detail.
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INTERVENING IN ETHANOL MARKETS
Economists generally believe that intervention in markets is not typically justified unless there is a well-defined market failure. A common example of a market failure is an externality, such as when one party's actions impose a cost on another party and market signals do not fully capture this cost. 67 Pollution is a case in point. A factory emitting smoke will not generally take into full account how its emissions affect people downwind of its plant, unless there is some type of government regulation. 68 Other market failures can result from market structure, such as monopoly, or difficulties in obtaining information. There are two main arguments advanced in favor of fuel ethanol production. (1960) . Coase argued that regulation is needed to establish property rights in the case of large transactions costs, where the initial property rights allocation matters. 69 Other arguments include offsetting gasoline subsidization, developing rural America, and supporting an infant industry. These arguments do not have much merit. A better way to ensure that gasoline does not have an advantage is to eliminate support to gasoline. Ethanol plants only modestly add to rural development because they do not require many employees One suggests that ethanol is better than fossil fuel use on environmental grounds; the other suggests that ethanol production is better than the use of imported oil on energy security grounds. I discuss the merits of these two arguments below.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENT
Ethanol has been associated with reductions in greenhouse gases relative to gasoline. 70 The regulatory impact analysis for the Environmental Protection Agency's Renewable Fuels Standard estimates that increasing ethanol use to the 6.7 billion gallon minimum would result in an 11 percent decrease in greenhouse gas emissions, a result similar to that calculated by other studies. 71 There are reasons to believe that the estimated greenhouse gas reductions might be greatly overstated. For example, the estimates assume that one energy unit of ethanol displaces one energy unit of oil.
72 This one-for-one assumption is not likely to hold in a global economy because as ethanol production increases, the price of oil can be expected to decline due to lower U.S. oil imports. The lower price of oil could lead to more use of oil worldwide. Thus, some factor less than one-for-one is appropriate. Another problem is that many studies do not adequately take into account the impact that lower U.S. corn exports could have on corn production elsewhere. The decrease in corn exports may cause other countries to convert previously unused, marginal lands, for example, into farm lands, which will also increase global emissions of greenhouse gases. Some scholars, such as Hill et al., acknowledge that the small reduction in greenhouse gas emissions associated with ethanol use may not be robust to alternate assumptions. 74 One of the greatest challenges to the greenhouse gas reductions attributed to ethanol is from a recent study led by Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen. The study finds that the amount of nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas, emitted through agriculture was previously underestimated. Accounting for the increase in nitrous oxide emissions actually results in net increases in greenhouse gases from the production and use of biofuels such as ethanol. If correct, this study could drastically alter the perception of the greenhouse gas benefits of ethanol. 75 In general, many studies focus on the greenhouse gas emissions associated with ethanol use, but ignore some of the other environmental impacts including resource depletion, ozone depletion, acidification, human and ecological health, and smog formation. 76 Aside from greenhouse gas emissions, several scholars believe that the overall environmental effects of ethanol are no better than gasoline, and in some cases, may actually be worse. 77 Hill et al. find potentially greater human health impacts due to ethanol use because of increased numbers of other air pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides, in line with other studies. 78 Niven finds that ethanol may increase smog formation. 79 A recent study by Jacobson concludes that a fleet of vehicles running on E85 (85% ethanol blend) is not likely to improve air quality and may cause more health risks than a fleet of newable Fuels in the Member States of the European Union, SEC (2007) at 9 (Jan. 10 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/07_biofuels_progress_report_en.pdf. 74 See Hill et al., supra note 70 at 11207. Importantly, their study only considers pollution from land already in corn production. In reality, increased demand for ethanol will increase the amount of land devoted to growing corn; they acknowledge that converting intact ecosystems to production would reduce the emissions savings or even result in net gains in emissions. 75 In addition, the production of ethanol from corn is likely to cause environmental degradation through soil erosion and the use of pesticides and fertilizers, contributing to water and air pollution. 81 Environmental concerns also exist regarding the impacts on wildlife and biodiversity, especially if land that has been set aside for conservation purposes is used in corn production.
82 Some analysts also worry about the high amount of water that ethanol plants require, limiting their expansion in cities such as Tampa Bay, FL, Pipestone, MN, and Chesapeake, VA that could not guarantee water availability. 83 According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, water use for ethanol plants ranged between 1 gallon to 11 gallons per gallon of ethanol, with an average of 4.7 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol.
84 Some see potential water shortages as the biggest setback to corn ethanol as a viable renewable resource, dubbing it as the "Achilles heal." 85 At best, ethanol made from corn has slightly lower greenhouse gas emissions than gasoline. The entire environmental picture appears muddier, with ethanol potentially having worse overall environmental outcomes than gaso- line. In summary, the environmental argument for ethanol is weak.
B. ENERGY SECURITY ARGUMENT
The other argument for ethanol production and use is that it promotes U.S. energy security. Energy security relates to the idea that problems resulting from abrupt changes in energy supply and price disruptions can be reduced. 87 Energy security has been used as a justification for various types of energy policy, such as import quotas, tariffs, and subsidies for domestic producers.
88 I focus on energy security specifically as it relates to the U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Table 11 , available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/forecasting.html. Energy security is also often used as a defense for the tariff on Brazilian ethanol. See Grassley, supra note 66, who believes that not developing our domestic ethanol production could just shift us from one kind of dependence, i.e. dependence on foreign oil, to another, i.e. dependence on foreign ethanol. In 2006, the U.S. imported 653.3 million gallons of ethanol, 66 percent of which was from Brazil. The value of decreased oil imports, called the oil premium, is based on the benefit associated with U.S. buying power in the oil market, and the avoided costs of economic shocks. I explain these potential benefits below.
The first potential benefit that I consider is associated with U.S. buying power in the oil market. 91 Because the U.S. is a large importer of oil, a reduction in U.S. oil imports could lead to a reduction in the world price of oil. If so, the U.S. would then pay less for the oil it still imports. This benefit is some- Even if the percentage of total military expenses devoted to oil protection were known, it would be almost impossible to know the incremental cost associated with each additional unit of oil the U.S. imports from the area. We do not include a value for reduced military expenditures because we believe that this value is likely to be small or negligible at the margin. See Taylor & Van Doren, supra note 8 (who also do not include reduced military spending when calculating the benefits of reducing our demand for foreign oil). Another possible benefit of reducing the U.S. oil purchases is less funding for terrorist activities that could adversely impact the U.S. We do not include this potential benefit because we are not aware of any scholarly effort to monetize it on a per barrel basis. times referred to as the monopsony benefit. 92 In addition, energy dependence can impose costs through the economic shocks of sudden oil price increases. 93 In the 1970s, there were two major oil crises. In both cases, instability and war in the Middle East led to high gasoline prices, which were followed by unemployment and inflation in the U.S. 94 Although there may be an empirical link between oil price increases and economic slumps, the exact mechanism is unclear. 95 Some scholars, such as Bohi, believe that factors other than energy price shocks contributed greatly to the extensive declines in output and employment. 96 Kilian, as well as Blanchard and Gali, suggest that today's economy may be more resilient to shocks than the economy of the 1970s. 97 Even if oil price shocks have a significant adverse impact on the U.S. economy, importing less oil is only a partial solution. The influence of oil shocks depends on petroleum consumption in the U.S. and not on U.S. oil imports. 98 The U.S. economy could still react negatively to abruptly changing world oil prices if all U.S. oil imports were eliminated, especially if consumption were not lowered. 99 Moreover, relying solely on domestic production is not feasible in the near future. The costs of increasing domestic energy supplies or increasing the efficiency of energy consumption are prohibitive. 100 According to Toman, a good way to promote energy security is to decrease U.S. dependence on gasoline in general by increasing the use of other fuels and energy systems in transportation. 101 One strategy is to subsidize either the production or development of "alternative" fuels, such as ethanol.
People frequently point to Brazil as an example of a country that is promoting energy security through ethanol. By law, Brazilian gasoline must have 20 to 25 percent ethanol in it.
The Brazilian experience is not easily transferred to other countries. Even if it could be transferred, it is not without its problems. For example, Brazilian ethanol is much cheaper to produce than U.S. ethanol because it is made primarily from sugarcane and not from corn, which is cheap to grow in Brazil and produces more gallons of ethanol per acre. 103 Second, Brazilian ethanol releases less carbon dioxide, a subset of greenhouse gases, because less energy is used to convert sugarcane into ethanol than is used to convert corn into ethanol. 104 Finally, as Figure 3 suggests, Brazil has been increasing its domestic production of oil, which has been a major factor in its reduced dependence on foreign sources. Since almost all future production of ethanol is currently based on corn, it is unlikely that ethanol can make the U.S. energy independent. President Bush's plan to reduce gasoline consumption by 20% in ten years is simply not feasible through corn ethanol. 105 The current ethanol program uses about 15% of U.S. corn supplies and makes up about 3% of gasoline consumption. 106 Ac-cording to a study by the Government Accountability Office, this small percentage of gasoline displacement has not significantly enhanced U.S. energy security.
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Ethanol from corn does not currently contribute much to energy security and is not likely to do so in the future. According to Hill et al., using all the corn produced in the U.S. in 2005 for ethanol production would only offset 12% of gasoline and diesel demand. 108 Dias de Oliveira et al. calculate that all available cropland in the U.S. would have to be used for corn production if all vehicles are to run on E85. By 2048, the entire country would need to be filled with corn plantations. 109 The maximum amount of ethanol that can be produced from corn supplies is about 15 to 16 billion gallons, which is equivalent to approximately nine percent of conventional motor gasoline supplied in 2005. 110 Due to projected increases in the demand for gasoline, the Energy Information Administration estimates that ethanol will actually likely account for only 7.6% of total gasoline use in 2030. 111 Neither the President's plan, nor any other large scale plan to introduce corn ethanol, is likely to have a dramatic impact on the type of fuel used by most domestic vehicles. Expanded ethanol use could, however, be part of a larger strategy aimed at reducing dependence on oil.
C. CELLULOSIC ETHANOL
One way that ethanol could contribute more to energy security is if it were made from something other than corn. In fact, some environmentalists support current corn ethanol production because they see it as a stepping stone to cellulosic ethanol. The Bush administration specifically mentions the importance of cellulosic ethanol in their plan's feasibility. 108 Hill et al., supra note 70. This is equivalent to 2.5 percent of gasoline and diesel consumption because of the fossil energy required to produce ethanol and biodiesel. Importantly, the 12 percent is likely to be an upper bound because some corn would be needed for human and animal consumption. 109 Dias de Oliveira et al., supra note 49, at 600-01. 110 See GAO, DOE Lacks a Strategic Approach, supra note 83. In the short run, however, the maximum amount of ethanol demanded in fuel might be even lower. Keith Collins, the Chief Economist of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, estimates the practical limit of ethanol demand to be less than 14 billion gallons, based on calculations of how much ethanol would be required if every vehicle ran on 10 percent ethanol. tually achieve some energy security for the U.S. In fact, a Department of Energy study cited by the Government Accountability Office estimates that there is sufficient biomass in wood chips and corn stalks to potentially produce about 60 billion gallons of ethanol per year by 2030, which would be about 30 percent of the amount of gasoline consumption projected by the Energy Information Administration for 2030.
113
Although money for research and development for cellulosic ethanol has increased in recent years, cellulosic has not received nearly the support in the form of tax credits and other incentives that has been given to current corn ethanol production.
This section has reviewed general arguments in favor of intervening in markets to support the production of ethanol. The next section takes a closer look at the benefits and costs of supporting ethanol production from an economic point of view.
IV. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE U.S. ETHANOL PROGRAM
The potential benefits of supporting ethanol include energy security and environmental benefits. The potential costs include the increased cost of producing the fuel relative to producing or purchasing petroleum. In addition, there are likely to be some environmental costs as well. I consider these in turn. My primary interest here is in quantifying those costs and benefits that can be measured with some degree of certainty. I also identify some potential costs and benefits that are not easily quantified.
The costs to date, in terms of plant infrastructure and increased corn plantings, have been high. 114 The benefits appear to be low, based on the relatively small amount of gasoline displacement and the uncertain air quality benefits. While a complete benefit-cost test of the ethanol program to date has not been done, I believe that the high costs of the program were likely to have exceeded any benefits.
115 Though unlikely to have resulted in net benefits in the past, some scholars believe that advances in technology will make corn ethanol pro- 113 As cited by GAO, DOE Lacks a Strategic Approach supra note 83, at 18. Using this ethanol would require investment in flex-fuel vehicles. See Collins, supra note 110. 114 I do not take into account government subsidies here. A 1986 study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture is worth noting because it was one of the first negative assessments of the ethanol program released by the government. Earle E. Gavett et al., Fuel Ethanol and Agriculture: An Economic Assessment, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) AER0562 (1986). The study concluded that the ethanol industry is likely to cost the government, taxpayers, and consumers billions of dollars in the future if it is allowed to continue. In fact, decreasing ethanol production to zero would save consumers $7 to $9 billion dollars. According to the study, if the goal of subsidizing ethanol is to raise farm income, it would be more economical for the government to just directly pay farmers the amount they would get from the ethanol subsidy. Id. at iv-v.duction more cost-effective. They point to the experience of Brazil, whose sugarcane ethanol industry may have experienced cost savings over time. I focus my analysis on the likely benefits and costs of existing policies. 116 I present a detailed analysis of the ethanol industry in 2012, taking many of the Environmental Protection Agency's optimistic assumptions as given.
117 I find that costs are much more likely to exceed benefits even when I account for various uncertainties about the cost-benefit numbers. Below I provide some details about the monetized costs and benefits, including our reservations about some of the estimates.
A. BENEFITS
The quantifiable benefits of increased ethanol use include those related to energy security and the environment. 118 The Environmental Protection Agency models both the oil displacement and greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions in its regulatory impact analysis.
119 I monetize these impacts using estimates obtained from the literature. 120 The impacts are defined as the changes resulting from increasing ethanol production from the baseline of four billion gallons per year to the renewable fuels standard (RFS) of almost seven billion gallons per year. The Environmental Protection agency also considers a second scenario where ethanol production reaches almost ten billion gallons per year, called the Energy Information Agency (EIA) scenario. That is the level of production that the Energy Information Agency predicts ethanol will reach by 2012 if current subsidies remain in place. 118 We value the greenhouse gas emissions at values accepted for carbon dioxide emission reductions, since the greenhouse gas estimates were presented as carbon dioxide equivalent tons. The third benefit category not shown separately is the decreased emissions of hydrocarbons such as benzene. These benefits are included in the total benefits, but were not shown separately because they were very small relative to the other benefit categories. 119 See EPA, RIA, supra note 9. 120 To monetize energy security, we multiply the projected displacement of oil by the average value per dollar according to the literature. The estimate is driven up by the high estimates of Leiby, supra note 107, which take into account the resulting falling price of gasoline. The Environmental Protection Agency's estimate of gasoline displacement assumes that the price of gasoline remains constant; hence, the Leiby estimates may overstate the benefits. The emission and greenhouse gas data was valued at accepted values from the literature. See longer version of paper for details. 121 The Energy Information Administration predicts even higher production of ethanol in its 2007 energy outlook. See EIA, Annual Outlook 2007, supra note 17 at Table A17 , converted from quadrillion Btus nario.
122 I linearly extrapolate benefits between the three points, the origin, the RFS scenario, and the EIA scenario to estimate trends. The graph also shows the relative contributions of oil displacement, greenhouse gas reductions, and air toxic emission reductions. 
B. COSTS
Figure 5 provides estimates the future costs of increased ethanol production. Unlike in many benefit-cost analyses, the costs in the case of ethanol include more than just monetary costs. The costs also include the values of the negative air quality impacts associated with increased ethanol. As before, I use the Environmental Protection Agency's best estimates for the production cost and the increased emissions from ethanol production and use. Figure 5 summarizes the total costs. 125 The total costs are significantly higher than the total benefits, ranging from about $1.5 billion for the RFS scenario to about $3 billion for the EIA scenario. The main costs are the direct production costs associated with the fuel changes resulting from expanded use of ethanol over oil, the excess burden associated with the government subsidies, and the negative air quality impacts, most importantly the increased nitrogen oxides emissions from ethanol use that contribute to fine particulate matter formation, which can have negative human health effects. particulate matter-10, and sulfur oxides, which are valued at about $1,400, $500, and $6,500 per ton, respectively. Increases in acetaldehyde are worrisome for some scholars, but we could not find a value for them. The excess burden was valued at 25 percent of the value of the subsidies, following OMB Circular A-94, available at .http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a094.html. 125 I assume here that farmers get no support in the status quo. If deficiency payments were the alternative, I would have to compare the decrease in the payments going to farmers with the ethanol subsidy and without. See Gardner, Fuel Ethanol Subsidies, supra note 19 (discussing the relative merits of each as a farm price support). 126 See EPA, RIA, supra note 9, at 322. These health effects include changes in mortality risk, chronic bronchitis, nonfatal heart attacks, respiratory hospital admissions, and asthma attacks.
Air quality costs and deadweight loss costs are distinct, although they happen to coincide. Figure 6 shows the relative levels of total costs and total benefits under the two scenarios. The results suggest that production of ethanol over four billion gallons will cost society much more than it will benefit society. Unlike in many benefit-cost analyses, the costs in the case of ethanol include more than just monetary costs; the costs also include the values of the negative air quality impacts associated with increased ethanol.
C. BENEFITS AND COSTS
I believe the actual net benefits would be lower than those estimated here for a number of reasons related to the Environmental Protection Agency's methodology. For example, I noted previously that the agency estimates that one energy unit of ethanol displaces one energy unit of gasoline, assuming that the price of oil will remain constant. If the price of oil decreases, oil use might increase more than expected, resulting in a displacement that is less than one to one. This is further complicated by my use of a high average value for oil displacement. 127 Thus, my estimate of energy security benefits is likely to be overstated.
The Environmental Protection Agency also estimates the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas benefits without taking into account more marginal corn land use and international effects of increased ethanol use in the U.S. As the value of corn increases, more corn will be planted.
128 Some of this land will come from decreased plantings of soybean and cotton.
129 Other land will come from land that was previously set aside for biodiversity or other purposes under conservation reserve contracts. 130 This land may be overworked or less suitable for farming, meaning that the marginal costs and energy used to produce more gallons of ethanol are likely to increase. This also means that the carbon dioxide released during production is likely to increase. International effects are also important because, as the price of oil decreases due to lower U.S. imports, consumption around the world might increase, especially in underdeveloped countries. Greenhouse gas emissions are ultimately a global problem and the international impacts may offset, or even exceed, some of the gains in carbon dioxide reductions in the U.S. Finally, the agency might not have adequately accounted for increased nitrous oxide emissions, which may outweigh the carbon dioxide reductions and lead to net increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
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In addition to these main concerns, many negative impacts were not monetized in the above analysis due to difficulties in estimating their value. These include land use change, biodiversity loss, groundwater contamination (especially its role in increasing the "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico), soil erosion, heavy water use, acidification, and international effects in general. Also, the focus on ethanol as a way to reduce greenhouse gases may make it difficult for policy makers to select better climate policy options later. For example, once an ethanol plant is built, it will be hard for a politician to close it down by withdrawing the subsidy. The bottom line is that the net costs of ethanol could be substantially larger than I have estimated here.
Even when I take into account large uncertainties in some of the estimates using, both the EIA scenario and the RFS scenario still produce costs in excess of benefits more than 99%of the time. I demonstrate this by running a Monte Carlo simulation of 2,500 trials for both the RFS and the EIA scenarios. 132 The simulation selects probability distributions for key parameters and then esti-127 My estimate is an average of the estimates in the literature. I include the Leiby estimate, which is much higher than the other estimates and drives up my average. See Leiby, supra note 107. 128 See Westcott, supra note 43. 129 Id. 130 Id. 131 See Crutzen et al., supra note 8. 132 We used @Risk to run the analysis. The data had converged after 2,500 trials. The details of this simulation are described in a more technical paper. See Hahn & Cecot, supra note 117.
mates the benefits and costs based on those distributions. 133 For the RFS scenario, the uncertainty analysis yielded a mean net benefit of negative $1.5 billion with a standard deviation of about $700 million. The net benefits were negative in more than 99%of the trials.
For the EIA scenario, the uncertainty analysis yielded a mean net benefit of negative $3 billion with a standard deviation of about $1.5 billion. The net benefit was negative in more than 97%of the trials. Our analysis strongly suggests that it is very unlikely that increasing ethanol production to the level fostered by current subsidies will result in net benefits for society. Most likely, society will incur costs that are hundreds of millions of dollars greater than the benefits.
V. THE POLITICS OF ETHANOL SUPPORT

A. The Interest Group Framework
Given the questionable environmental and energy security benefits of ethanol, the high level of political and public support may seem puzzling. In fact, much of the political support for ethanol can be explained using public choice theory. 134 This theory examines the motivations of individuals, interest groups and politicians to help explain policy outcomes. In this framework, ongoing farm policy is the logical result of political pressures from agricultural interest groups that have a strong interest in enacting and maintaining support through subsidies and other means. 135 In some cases, these groups are able to exert influence because the benefits of such policies are concentrated but the costs are diffuse.
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The corn lobby appears to be very strong. For example, the National Corn 133 These distributions depend on the literature. For example, if the literature presents a best estimate and high and low values for an input, we use a triangular probability distribution. 134 (1989) . The ethnocentric theory argues that agricultural protection is something uniquely American, stemming from America's history or philosophy. Since many Americans can trace their roots back to farmers, they have a romanticized view of farming and support the government transfer systems. This theory has been largely discredited since it does not explain the pervasiveness of agricultural subsidies around the world, especially in countries without the history of farming that exists in the U.S. Another theory, the social contract theory, describes farm programs as agreements made by the public and farmers for mutual benefit. Robert Paarlberg, supra, at 1162, notes that the social contract theory helps explain the uniquely American practice of paying farmers to keep land idle for environmental reasons. Though the social contract theory is useful, it is not clear why it would be in the interest of the average consumer to subsidize farmers in general. 135 Growers Association and the Corn Refiners Association have spent about $9 million in lobbying expenditures between 1998 and 2007. 137 Corn-related political action committees regularly donate to political parties and election campaigns. 138 These groups support ethanol because ethanol raises the demand for corn, leading to higher corn prices and higher revenues for farm growers. 139 In addition, those farmers that own land benefit from increased land prices due to the increased value of corn production. 140 The reason these powerful interest groups support ethanol instead of direct payments to corn farmers may be political. Gardner finds that in most cases, direct deficiency payments are more beneficial to farmers than an ethanol subsidy. 141 He hypothesizes that farmers may focus on supporting ethanol in order to get additional lobbying assistance from ethanol producers. Over the last ten years, large organizations supporting ethanol, such as the Renewable Fuels Association, the National Ethanol Vehicle Coalition, the Clean Fuels Development Coalition, and the American Coalition for Ethanol have spent over $3 million in lobbying expenditures. 142 Ethanol producers represent a strong interest group. So far in 2007, just four ethanol producers spent almost one million dollars on lobbying. 143 By far the most powerful ethanol producer is Archer Daniels Midland. 144 In 1996, Dwayne Andreas, the chairman of Archer Daniels Midland, asserted: "We do not lobby. We have no lobbyist. We never lobby. Archer Daniels Midland has never lobbied in the 25 years since I've been here." 145 This has since changed. Already in 2007, Archer Daniels Midland has spent almost half a million dollars in lobbying expenditures. Furthermore, Archer Daniels Midland has given generously to organizations that lobby in favor of ethanol subsidies for many years. Over the last nine election cycles, Archer Daniels Midland has donated almost $8 million, mostly through soft money contributions when those were allowed, and more recently through political action committees and individuals. 146 One example of Archer Daniels Midland's influence occurred in 1986, when the price of corn had risen and the price of gasoline had fallen, leading to difficult conditions for ethanol producers. 147 149 The original provision was strongly supported by interest groups such as the National Corn Growers Association and Archer Daniels Midland. Together, the two groups spent almost a million dollars in contributions and lobbying expenditures. The amendment failed. Though stories like these do not prove a relationship, they do suggest that pro-ethanol interest groups wield a considerable amount of power.
There is another important reason policies to promote ethanol may receive widespread political support. It is not only supported by interest groups who directly profit from such government intervention, but also by some interest groups concerned with energy security and the environment that primarily support cellulosic ethanol in particular. 150 Johnson and Libecap describe how politicians, who have an incentive to obtain strong interest group support, sustain subsidies by presenting them as broadly beneficial. 151 Yandle, in his 1983 theory of "bootleggers and Baptists," argues that social regulations last when they are demanded by Baptists, or those in favor of public benefits from it, and bootleggers, or those who stand to profit from it. 152 Ethanol lends itself to support from both kinds of interest groups because of its profit potential for specific groups as well as its perceived contributions to energy security and to global warming abatement. Other scholars have noticed this tendency in the political advertisement of programs such as the space shuttle program, which emphasized technology spinoffs, and the oil import quota of the 1960s, which empha-sized energy security. 153 Unbiased information, according to Johnson and Libecap, may emerge if another group mobilizes opposition and sponsors research. 154 Johnson and Libecap cite ethanol as a case in point for their theories. They present evidence that negative research about ethanol was suppressed, such as a 1986 study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture explaining the high costs of ethanol to taxpayers, because there was not much opposition to the ethanol lobby. 155 Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the effect of interest group competition is Johnson and Libecap's account of the circumstances surrounding the use of ethanol over MTBE as a fuel oxygenate. 156 The Clean Air Act originally had a requirement that gave preference to ethanol as a fuel oxygenate, but this requirement was not enacted. The promotion of ethanol at the expense of MTBE brought powerful interest groups into the ethanol debate, specifically MTBE producers and natural gas producers. This led to a series of hearings in the House of Representatives where the previously unchallenged benefits of ethanol were challenged and the requirement was not passed. 157 
B. Will Support Continue
There is now the potential for a change in interest group competition because of policies that could greatly affect the production of corn and corn ethanol. For example, many livestock producers are opposed to incentives for expanding ethanol production. 158 The reason behind their opposition has to do with the rising corn prices that have resulted in part from government programs supporting ethanol. Already, corn prices have risen from $2.00 per bushel in 2005 to about $3.50 per bushel in 2007. 159 The U.S. Department of Agriculture released agricultural projections to 2016 that describe the effect projected corn prices will have on other sectors. 160 If ethanol tax credits stay in place, corn is projected to rise to a high of $3.75 per bushel in 2009 and then slowly fall to $3.30 per bushel in 2016 as ethanol production slows and other sectors ad-just. 161 High corn prices translate into higher feedstock costs for livestock producers, leading to reduced meat production, especially in the first few years of rapidly increasing ethanol production. 162 The price of meat is expected to increase and the per capita consumption of meat to decrease, leading to lower revenues for meat producers. 163 Some livestock producers are expected to be hit harder than others. Animals such as beef and dairy cattle, for example, can use leftovers from ethanol production, called distillers dried grains or co-product, more readily than other animals, such as hogs and poultry. 164 In addition, though the use of the co-product will offset some of the costs for beef and dairy cattle, the potential effect on quality may be an important issue in the future. 165 The opposition is speaking out against ethanol incentives. The executive director of the North Dakota Policy Council blamed government support of ethanol as the reason behind the shrinking profit margins of North Dakota livestock producers. 166 In fact, in June 2007, a coalition of livestock organizations revealed a new website called BalancedFoodandFuel.org meant to inform the public about the impact of ethanol policy. 167 The coalition members include the American Meat Institute, the National Chicken Council, the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, the National Meat Association, the National Milk Producers Federation, the National Pork Producers Council, the National Turkey Federation, and United Egg Producers.
The livestock interest groups have already shown that they can organize themselves and they have large resources to dispense in Washington. The eight members of the coalition that developed BalancedFoodandFuel.org spent over $16 million in the last ten years on lobbying expenses. In 2006 alone, they spent about $2.6 million. It appears that these organizations have the resources to be heard if they decide to enter the ethanol debate. 168 In various speeches in 2007, President Bush acknowledged the increasing strain rising corn prices impose on many livestock producers and reiterated his hope for future advances in cellulosic ethanol technology. 169 The Center for Responsive Politics already thinks some effect of livestock lobbying is apparent. The 2007 energy bill requires increases in ethanol production from corn and other feedstocks, language that differs from past bills, which focused on corn ethanol.
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The political interest in supporting ethanol has been and continues to be strong. There are signs, however, that other interest groups could limit the popularity of extending certain kinds of policies. The trend appears to be towards a less positive view of ethanol. The political science literature on policy persistence suggests that it is much easier to start a subsidy program than to end one. 171 The import tariff expires at the end of 2008, while the tax credit expires at the end of 2010. The period between 2008 and 2010 is expected to mark the height of projected corn prices. I believe that it is likely that other interest groups will have some success in limiting the reach of these two government programs. At the very least, I believe that new ethanol production may not enjoy the same level of effective subsidization as existing domestic production. 172 
C. Implications for the efficiency of Energy and Climate Policy
Ethanol is but one example, albeit an important one, of the politicization of energy policy. 173 There are a host of advocates for different kinds of alternative fuels, including hydrogen, methanol, and nuclear. More broadly, rent-seeking occurs across the wide array of different fuels including "clean" coal, oil and nuclear, to mention a few. With all this lobbying, it should not come as a surprise that our energy policy does not look particularly "efficient" from an economic point of view. Several economists have tried to estimate these inefficiencies in different areas, such as with the pricing of gasoline at the pump. 174 quently trump economics in the making of policy. The degree of inefficiency may change because of interest group politics, but in general, there is no reason to expect that either energy policy or climate change policy is economically efficient. Indeed, one would expect quite the opposite.
That is not to say that economic analysis, such as the one sketched in Section IV, will not help inform policy, but in most cases, it is not likely to be the driving force. For climate change policy, for example, this means that it would be foolhardy to presume that the U.S. will achieve its national, or international, goals in a manner that minimizes costs. 175 The problem is simply too important to politicians for them to not take into account the myriad political interests surrounding this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is difficult to build an economic case for providing special support for ethanol on the basis of alleged market failures. Ethanol made from corn is not likely to boost energy security much and its environmental benefits appear to be relatively small. Our analysis of the projected increase in ethanol production demonstrates that the costs are likely to exceed benefits by hundreds of millions of dollars annually in 2012 if current policies continue. The tax credit, the largest component of current support, is generally accepted to be an inefficient method for dealing with externalities.
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Contrary to conventional wisdom, I believe that continued support for ethanol along current lines is not a sure thing. My best guess is that ethanol can expect to receive some level of government support in the future, but will not enjoy the same kind of open-ended support it has in the past. The reason is that some interest groups will likely mobilize in opposition to further support for ethanol, and other interest groups may reduce their support. As increases in the price of corn affect other interest groups, such as beef producers, they will become more vocal in their opposition to corn ethanol. Furthermore, as it becomes clearer that the environmental benefits of ethanol are small, or even negative, environmentalists are likely to reduce their support.
The U.S. Congress should consider more sensible approaches to environmental and energy goals that take advantage of market signals to achieve the desired end. 177 The government should learn a lesson from its ethanol policy, and refrain from picking winners and losers.
We suggest three policies related to ethanol that can promote energy security and environmental goals more efficiently. First, the U.S. should repeal the ethanol import tariff. The tariff prevents the U.S. from diversifying its fuel use 175 I explore these ideas in more detail in a forthcoming paper on that subject. 176 After analyzing the ethanol tax credit, the Congressional Research Service stated that tax expenditures are generally an inefficient way to deal with environmental or energy security concerns because they do not directly address any of the external costs of gasoline. See GAO, DOE Lacks a Strategic Approach, supra note 83, at 43. 177 Some scholars suggest modifying the nature of the tax credit, so that it is tied to gasoline prices. See Miranowski, supra note 37. Given that corn ethanol cannot survive on its own even in times of high gasoline prices, it is unreasonable to subsidize it at all.
by taking advantage of a relatively low cost source of ethanol. 178 For that reason alone, the costs of the tariff are likely to outweigh its benefits. When one also includes the likely negative benefits from increased domestic production of corn-based ethanol, removing the tariff is an even more attractive policy.
Second, the U.S. should limit direct domestic support for alternative energy sources to basic research. Basic research for ethanol could be supported, but it is only one of many alternative fuels that should be considered. There is only so much land in the U.S. that could be effectively planted and other uses should not have to compete with a subsidized ethanol program. For example, biotechnologists are working on other substitutes to ethanol that may have greater benefits. 179 Biomass to electricity and nuclear represent two other greenhouse gas abatement methods that are likely to be more cost-effective than ethanol. In fact, some scholars, such as Patzek, worry that the increased attention to ethanol takes focus away from real energy solutions. 180 Third, the U.S. should consider taxing key externalities, such as those related to energy security and the environment. Implementing such taxes is not a simple matter; however, it can be done. Moreover, taxes represent a simple, cost-effective method for inducing appropriate levels of conservation for different types of fuels.
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I am not optimistic that legislators will ignore political realities and implement an economical solution to the problems of energy security and improving the environment. At the same time, I believe policy makers are more likely to consider changes when the consequences of their policy decisions are more widely appreciated. Moreover, I believe that other political imperatives, such as those driven by beef producers and the need to respond to climate change, may present opportunities to adopt more economically efficient policies. 
APPENDIX
